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STATE REGULATION OF THE CANAL. CORPORATION
IN COLORADO.
of the common law doctrine of riparian
I NAPPLICABILITY
rights to conditions in the arid region moved the first territorial
legislature of Colorado to recognize the counter doctrine of
prior appropriation. In fact, the right to the water in the streams of
Colorado, by prior appropriation, antedated any legislation. "It wa,s
the common law of the people, and legislation, both national and territorial, was but a recognition declaratory of the right as it had
theretofore and then existed."1 Adhering to territorial precedent,
Colorado was the first state to incorporate the priority doctrine in
its organic law.
The state constitution declares the water of every natural stream
to be public property and dedicated to the use of the people of the
state. It guarantees the right to divert for a beneficial purpose the
unappropriated waters of every natural stream (within the state)
to riparian and non-riparian lands; . To this end the right of eminent
domain is granted across public, private and corporate lands, to
persons, associations and corporations constructing ditches, canals
and flumes. The controlling principle of water apportionment is
that priority of appropriation gives superiority of right among appropriators for a like beneficial purpose.2
No sooner was the organic law promulgated than it was strained
by a lack of correspondence with new economic conditions. Blind
to the impending growth and importance of the canal corporation,
the constitutional convention had merely assimilated it to general
principles of control evolved with reference to non-corporate canals.
Upon the legislature, consequently, fell the difficult ·task of giving
effect to the general principles and adapting them to the character
of the canal corporation.
~ l

Colo. App. 57. Armstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Company.
Colo. Const. XVI., secs. 5·7; 6 Colo. 449. To illustrate the distribution of watllf"
for irrigation under this theory: the first appropriator from a stream takes what he
needs up to the decreed limit of his right; then, if water remains in the stream, the
later appropriators take their supply in the order of date of acquisition of rights. If
the volume of a stream were uniform from year to year, all appropriations up to tlae
flow of the stream would be equally assured, and the only important feature of a
water-right would be its volume. But the fiow of a stream varies daily and an·
nually. At times it will supply all the diverting canals; and at other times. only a
few of them. In the event of inadequate :flow the appropriators are supplied in the
order of the date of their water·rlghts. J. S. Greene. Acquirement of Water-Rights in
the Arkansas Valley in Colorado, 1913, in U. S. Dept. of Agr., Office of F;xp. Sta.,
9

BWJ. No.

140, p. 12.
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When the constitutional convention met, the canal corporation
was a negligible factor in Colorado agriculture. Prior to I878
most canals were constructed on a small scale, either by individual
farmers or co-operative associations of farmers to water their own
lands. With agricultural expansion to lands above the first river
bottom, the necessary irrigation works required a larger outlay of
capital than the farmer could furnish and canal development temporarily halted. Presently capital observed in canal construction a
lucrative field; and foreign or eastern corporations hastened to build
large canals in advance of agricultural settlement, hoping to reap
profits from the sale of water-rights and land to settlers.3
This development was begun in northeastern Colorado by a
Scotch corporation in the years I878-I883. It built the Larimer
and Weld canal of 50 miles at a cost of $I50,ooo, and the High
Line of 83 miles at a cost of $750,ooo. The same company later
constructed the Loveland and Greeley canal of 25 miles and the
Platte Valley canal of 20 miles. Together these four canals had
a capacity to water n5,ooo acres. 4 Four hundred miles of corporate canals were being constructed in I884 alone. By I885-I886
a majority of the canals building were financed by corporations as
speculative enterprises. Numerous large irrigation works were
commenced, and some completed, by corporate interests in I887r8go. 5 In the bench lands north of La Junta the Colorado Land and
'Vater Company built a 75-rnile canal capable of watering 50,000
acres. The Empire Land and Canal Company had 100,000 acres
under ditch on the Rio Grande del Norte and in San Luis park.
Other large enterprises in the San Luis valley were the Rio Grande
canal, capable of wateripg 240,000 acres, and the Del Norte with
a similar capacity.6 Not all of the tributary acres were actually cultivated; many were merely under ditch. This exploitation was
made possible by the railroad extension into the unsettled regions
in the eighties, inviting immigration and offering facilities calculated
to reimburse the promoter.
1 Agriculture as Developed by Irrigation in Colorado, by a Committee of the National Irrigation Congress, 1894. p. 10; Report of the Colorado State Engineer, 1885·
1886, p. 216.
• 13 Annual Report of the U. S. Geological Survey. 1891-1892, Part III, 139; R.
J. Hinton, Progress Report on Irrigation, Sen. Misc. Docs., 49 Cong., 2 Scss., I., No.
rs, pp. 132-133.
1 Elwood Mead, The Ownership of \Vatcr.
Danger from Monop!ies. Denver, Time•
Printing Works. 1887, p. 6; Report of Colo. State Engineer, 1885-1886, p. 216; u
U. S. Census, Agriculture by Irrigation, g1.
• 13 Annual Report, U. S. Gcol. Survey, Part III .• a1s; R. J. Hinton, Proarcas
Report on Irrigation. p. us; u U. S. Census, Agriculture by Irrigation, 129; Select
Commit~ on Irrigation and Reclamation of Arid !,ands, Sen. Reports, sr Cong., 1
Sess., IV., No. g28 (Stewart Report), Pt. 4, p. 325.
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Although non-corporate ditches predominated in 1890, a growing number of eastern slope irrigators depended for their water
supply upon canal corporations controlling the largest and most
important canals in the state. Those eastern counties where canal
capacity exceeded the normal water supply in 1889-among which
were the leading agricultural counties of the state-were largely
served by corporate canals.
When the constitution was framed (1876), irrigators as individuals or co-operative groups diverted directly from the natural
stream and made beneficial use of the water on their own land.
Hence the constitution made diversion from a natural stream, plus
beneficial use, essential to a prior appropriation of water. 7 With
the introduction of the canal corporation the owners of a ditch diverting from a natural stream were not themselves users of water
for a beneficial purpose. Should the legislature grant priorities to
the canal corporation which did divert from a natural stream but
did not make beneficial use of the water diverted; or, to the irrigator under the canal who made beneficial use of the water but
diverted from an artificial stream?
The legislature did not give eff~ct to the. constitutional provisions
governing appropriation until 1879. Alarmed by large canal projects
higher up stream, the Union Colony irrigators on the Cache-laPoudre united with irrigators from the Saint V rain and Boulder
to demand legislation enforcing priorities vested by the constitution. They met in convention in 1878 and drafted a report which
became the basis of the state law of 1879. This law amended in
detail, not in principle, remains the basis of the Colorado system of
water administration. The convention recommended (I) determination of priorities by the courts; (2) granting of priorities to the
ditch owner rather than attachment to the land watered; (3) basing
of the volume of water decreed upon the capacity of the canal instead of the amount of water used. 8 Doubtless. these proposals
seemed advantageous to the convention of irrigators owning their
ditches or holding stock in a colony ditch.
By the incorporation of these proposals in a law of 1879 the
legislature served a purpose near to its heart, viz., the encouragement of ditch construction with its consequent attraction of a
farming population. It was seen that grants of water-rights to
canals, with the privilege of sale to the working farmers, promised
a liberal return upon the cost of construction: an opportunity cerY 13 Colo. i20.
8 D. Boyd, Irrigation Near Greeley, in House Docs., 54 Cong.,
No. 351, pp. 61-62.

2
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tain to tempt the investment of outside capital.9 How successfully
the legislature fostered corporate canal construction is attested by
figures cited above.
The act of r879, regulating the use of water for irrigation, ordered the district courts to enter a decree determining priorities
of the several ditches in a district, each according to the date of
construction and enlargement, with the amount of water appropriated by said construction and enlargement. The capacity of a
ditch became the basis of a priority decree; beneficial use was disregarded. The law recognized no distinct and independent priority
in the consumers under the carrier canal. Thus in time of scarcity
of water, when the aggregate supply of the carrier canal was reduced, the law ordered a pro rata distribution to consumers, based
on the amount of water used rather than on priority of appropriation from the canal.1° In accord with the statutes, the courts,
generally waiving the constitutional requisite of beneficial use, issued decrees of priority to the ditch corporation. Moreover, they
did not inquire into the priorities of the several users, or secondary
appropriators, under a corporate canal. Neither did the state water
commissioners divide the water among the users under a corporate
ditch.11 The commissioners diverted the aggregate water accruing
to the priority of the canal corporation, which then divided it among
its consumers without state interference.
As an outgrowth of the law of r879 primary and secondary appropriations developed.
A primary appropriation was a water-right derived directly from
the state by judicial decree, under the public laws governing the
acquisition and administration of water-rights. The primary appropriator owned the ditch diverting water from the natural stream
and ripened the appropriation by beneficial use on his land. Most
Colorado farmers of I890 belonged to this class. Canal corporations were also primary appropriators though they did not ripen
their appropriation by beneficial use--this function being performed
by irrigators.12
A secondary appropriation was a water-right not derived directly
from the state by judicial decree under the public laws governing
the acquisition and administration of water-rights, but from a con-·
tract with corporations who qualified as primary appropriators.
I

Elwood Mead, Op. cit., s-6.

10 Colo. Session Laws. 1879, p. 97, acc. 4, p. 104, 1ec. 30; 13 Colo. 123·12.i.
u J. S. Greene, in Annual of the American Society of Irrigation Engineers, 1892·
1893, pp. 140-141.
12

J. S. Greene, Acquirement of Water-Rights in the Arkansas Valley in Colo., u, 34-
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Secondary appropriators were irrigators who did not own the ditch
diverting water from the natural stream, but participated by contract in the priority of the canal coporation. The contract, though
partially subject to state water law, imposed conditions not prescribed by constitution or statute. A large and growing number of
Colorado farmers were secondary appropriators in I89o.18
Legislative encouragement of corporate canal construction was
not without dangerous consequences. It interposed the canal corporation as a middleman between one class of irrigators and the
public waters dedicated by the constitution to the use of the people of the state. To a large extent the state abdicated legislative
and administrative control over secondary appropriators in favor
of the contractural control of the canal corporation. Thus the
prosperity of the secondary appropriator depended largely upon
the terms and execution of his contract with the water corporation.
The measure of state interference to guarantee equitable water
contracts becomes the criterion of fair and effective regulation of
the ditch corporations.
The canal corporation secured. revenue from the sale of waterrights and lands under ditch. Ofter the corporations owned land
under their canal and sold farms with water-rights on long term
and partial payments, taking a mortgage as security on lands thus
sold.14 Though the canal corporation ha,d a natural monopoly in
its district, the farmer might choose among the contracts of companies in various localities, provided he purchased both land and
water. But once having purchased land and water from a corporation, he became dependent upon it for his water supply. Likewise the farm owner purchasing a water-right seldom found more
than one source of supply available. To offset this natural monopoly, the companies were required, wherever they had unsold
water in their ditch, to sell it to the class of users specified in the
certificate of incorpation, at a legally established rate. Also, any
person having purchased and used water for irrigation of his land
from any ditch or reservoir, was guaranteed the right to continue
an equivalent purchase at a legally established rate, provided he did
not stop his purchase with the intent to procure water from some
other source of supply.15
Water contracts were of two classes: one selling a perpetual wau J. C. Ulrich, Irrigation in the Rocky Mountain States, 1899, in U. S. Dept.
of Agr., Office of ExP. Sta., Bull No. 73. p. 51.
•• u U. S. Census, Agriculture by Irrigation, 91; R. J. Hinton, Op. cit., 40 ,133;.
Irrigation Age, Feb. 1, 1892, p. 469.
u General Statutes of Colorado, 1883, sec. 3n, p. 199; sec. 1740, p. 568.
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ter-right itself ; the other selling a perpetual or determinate right
to rent water annually. The unit water-right was the supply of
water necessary to irrigate 80 acres of land, l 44-100 cubic feet of
water per second flowing over a weir at one of the lateral headgates of the canal.
In most cases the farmers under a corporate canal purchased a
perpetual water-right. The canal company in return for payments on the principal agreed to furnish each year a stated amount
of water continuously during a defined irrigating season; such water to be used only for irrigation and domestic purposes on the tract
described. It exacted, in addition to the principal, an annual assessment not to exceed twelve dollars per water-right for maintenance of the canal works. The manner of regulating the supply
of water was at all times under the control of the canal company.
In case the canal was unable to carry and distribute a volume of
water equal to its estimated capacity, either from casual or unforeseen or unavoidable accident; or if the volume of water proved
insufficient from drouth, or from any other cause beyond the control of the company, it was not liable for shortage so caused. During the insufficiency of the water supply to satisfy all outstanding
water-rights, the corporation had the right to distribute available
water to consumers on a pro rata basis.16
·
The parties agreed that, in event of failure by the consumer to
make the instalment payments on the principal or to pay the interest when due, the entire principal of the contract fell due, and
the company had the right, at the expiration of a certain period, to
foreclose and terminate the contract; provided, the consumer were
given notice of such intent. Often the company held a mortgage
on the consumer's farm as a pledge for the payment of his waterright. The mortgage was so executed that failure to make a single
payment caused the principal to fall due.17
When the consumer completed the payment of the principal sum
of this water contract, he received in exchange therefor a water
deed, which differed from the contract only in acknowledging the
receipt of its principal sum. The consumer continued to pay an
annual assessment for canal operation and maintenance to the corporation.18 Perpetual water-rights sold at prices varying from
$400 to $1,200, plus the annual maintenance charge.
Frequently the company agreed, when the volume of ·water-rights
1 • Stewart Report, VI., Pt. 4, pp. 297, 331, 338.
"Ibid., VI. Pt. 4, 298. 332, 339; V., Pt. 1, p. 76; n U. S. Census, Agricultur•
by Irrigation, 95.
.
11 Stewart Report, VI.. Pt. 4, p. 303.
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sold approximated the estimated capacity of the canal, to transfer
to the individual consumer shares of stock, proportionate to the
interest which a consumer's water-rights bore to the entire number of water-rights outstanding.19
Only a few canal companies rented water annually to irrigators.
Under this contract the canal corporation not only sold a short
term or perpetual right to buy water, but exacted from irrigators
an annual rental charge for the delivery of water, greater than the
_pro rata cost of canal operation and maintenance. Such contracts
incorporated certain standard provisions of the outright sale contract: concerning control of the distribution of water, irresponsibility
of the canal company for water shortage, and penalty for a consumer's failure to make partial payments promptly. There was no
provision for ultimate transfer. of canal stock to the consumers
under ditch. The High Line canal charged a bonus of $ro per acre
for the right to buy water, and an annual rental of $1.50 per acre
for delivery of the water. To justify these charges the high cost
of canal construction was pleaded. The rental not only defrayed
operating expenses but applied to. the principal of construction cost.
In 1887 the anti-royalty act invalidated the bonus feature of the
rental contract; whereupon some consumers preferred the determinate rental contract to the perpetual sale contract.20
How did the state interfere to guarantee equitable water contracts?
The constitution declares the general assembly shall provide by
law that the boards of county commissioners in their respective counties shall have power, when application is made by either party interested, to establish reasonable maximum rates to be charged for
the use of water, whether furnished by individuals or corporations.
Accordingly, the law of 1879 constituted the elective board of county
commissioners a quasi-judicial body to fix a just maximum rate
for ditches, canals and reservoirs furnishing and selling water, the
whole or upper part of which lay in the county limits. ·Requisite
for board action was an affidavit by a consumer showing reasonable
ground to believe that unjust prices were, or were likely to be,
charged for water from such ditch, canal or reservoir. If the
boards regarded the affidavit as convincing, they set a date, not
sooner than forty days after the receipt of the affidavit, when the
consumer and carrier were to be heard. The board examined the
testimony of both sides, issued subpoenas to witnesses, compelled at.. Ibid., 298·299, 331, 338•
.. J. S. Greene. Acquirement of Water Rights in the Arkansas Valley in Colorado,
"8r·83; R. J. Hinton, Op. cit., 132.
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tendance and production of books and papers. Thereupon the commissioners fixed a just maximum price, which was subject to change
once in two years. 21 The price-fixing power applied only to companies renting water annually. Establishment of a rate by the commissioners did not per se affect existing contracts between the irrigator and the vendor of water; nor did it affect or hinder the making of contracts at a rate above that fixed by the commissioners if
the higher rate were acceptable to both contracting parties. Under
the act of 1879 the county boards were impotent to fix a rate for
a canal the head-works of which lay in another county.
This defect led to the basic decision of Wheeler v. Northern
Colorado Irrigation Company, which clearly defined the status of
the canal corporation and declared the bonus or royalty of the rental
contracts unconstitutional.
The appellant owned a farm east of Denver watered by the
High Line Ditch, the property of the Northern Colorado Irrigation Company. He refused to buy in advance, at $ro per acre, the
right to procure water at an annual rental of $r.50 per acre; whereupon the High Line refused to deliver water, though the rental was
proffered. Since the headgates of the canal lay in Douglas county,
the commissioners of Arapahoe were impotent to intervene and fix
a maximum rental. Failing in his original proceedings for mandamus in the supreme court, Wheeler as relator instituted mandamus
proceedings in the district court of Arapahoe county. The respondent company demurred to the alternative writ; the demurrer was
sustained and judgment entered for the respondent. The plaintiff
then appealed to the supreme court and was heard in the December
term, 1887.22
Both the constitution and the common law were invoked to reverse the decision of the district court. ( l) The constitution dedicates all unappropriated water in the natural streams of the state
"to the use of the people", the ownership thereof being vested in
"the public". (2) After appropriation the title to the water remains in the general public, while the paramount right to its use
continues in the appropriator. To constitute a valid appropriation
the water diverted must be applied within a reasonable time to some
beneficial use. Thus the diversion ripens into a valid appropriation
only when the water is utilized by the consumer.23 (3) It follows
that the canal company does not become a "proprietor" of the water
diverted, but a mere carrier, a quasi-public servant or agent. The
Colo. Session Laws, I879, pp. 94·96, secs. I·2.
" 9 Colo. 248, 256, 257; IO Colo. 582·585.
"IO Colo. s87, 588.
:t
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.constitutional recognition of the carrier's right to compensation for
transporting water, and the provision for a quasi-judicial tribunal
to fix an equitable maximum charge, must be correspondingly interpreted. Carrier's status is not that of a private individual contracting for the sale or use of his private property. It exists largely
for the benefit of others, being engaged in the business of transporting for hire, water owned by the public, to the people owning
the right to its use. The carrier is permitted to appropriate water
.and to exercise the power of eminent domain. Its business is affirmatively sanctioned, and its profits are fairly guaranteed. In return for these privileges, it is, for the public good, charged with
certain duties and subjected to a reasonable control. (4) By fair
implication "any unreasonable regulations or demands that operate
to withhold or prevent the exercise of this constitutional right (use
.of water) by the consumer must be held illegal, even though there
be no e:i..-press legislative declaration on the subject". 2 i
The respondent's demand of $Io per acre, as an advance payment of part of the transportation charge for the remaining years
of its corporate existence, was declared "illegal as well as unreasonable and oppressive".25
Barring constitution and statutes, the court found strong legal
ground for the position that the carrier's demands for rates, and
the time and manner of collection, must be reasonable. "The carrier voluntarily engages in the enterprise; it has, in most instances,
from the nature of things, a monopoly of the business along the
line of its canal; its vocation, together with the use of its property,
are closely allied to the public interest; its conduct in connection
therewith materially affects the community at large; it is charged
with what the decisions term a public duty or trust * * *. For
these reasons it would be held at common law to have submitted it·self to a reasonable judicial control, invoked and exercised for the
common good, in the matter of regulation of charges". In short
the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois was applied to carriers of water.26
Early in I887 the farmers had no assurance that the supreme
-court would pronounce royalties illegal. Court proceedings were
-at best a cumbersome and expensive method of controlling the rental
.of water by corporations. And the Wheeler decision, though favorable to consumers, would apply to a past irrigating season. Would
there not be an ever recurring struggle to escape the payment of
royalties; and would not the attendant delay prevent actual ir"Ibid. 590.
~Ibid. 594.
"' Ibid. 589, 590.
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ngation of crops? Speaking to farmers on the ownership of water
in r887, Elwood Mead divined in the speculative development of
canals the intent to charge water rates far above the cost of canal
·construction, and the foundation of monopolies a hundred-fold more
exacting than Irish landlordism. 27 Beset by these fears the irrigators
under the High Line in Arapahoe, Jefferson and Douglas counties,
launched the Farmers' State Protective Association to lobby for the
enactment of an anti-royalty bill by- the legislature. The ~xecutive
committee of the association was composed of Wheeler and two
other irrigators, all active Grangers. The fight in the senate was long
and bitter; for three weary months the committee labored incessantly. 28 On April 4, 1887, the anti-royalty bill received the governor's
approval and was in force three months later. It fotbade the ditch
companies to impose a royalty, bonus, or premium, prerequisite or
.condition precedent to the right or privilege of applying or bargaining for and procuring water. The penalty for violation of the law
was a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500, or imprisonment of the officers or agents of a ditch company for a term of not
less than three months, nor more than one year.29
The legislature of 1887 also passed an act enabling the county
-commissioners to fix rates within their county for "any ditch, canal,
conduit, or reservoir, the whole or any part of which shall lie in
-such coutity".80 Thus was remedied the defect in the statute of
t879 which forced Wheeler to seek judicial relief from oppressive
water rates in his county.
Renters of water now seemed doubly fortified against the im-position of royalties. During the session of 1888 the master of the
-Grange thanked God "that royalty * * * is dead-killed first by
-public sentiment. Then by the noble justices of the Supreme Court
-Helm and Beck-who fearlessly put their heels upon the serpent's
hydra head. It has long threatened to crush within its deadly folds
the occupation, the life and liberty of the farmer." 31
Water shortage in the late eighties crystallized the growing dis-content with the operation of the water laws and the results of the
leading court decisions. 32
Senior consumers under corporate canals resented the inclusion
-of pro rating clauses, validated by the law of 1879, in all types of
"'Elwood Mead, Op. cit., 6, 7.
21 Journal of Proceedings of the Colorado State Grange, 1888, pp, 18, 23 •
.. Colo. Session Laws, 1887, pp. 308, 309•
.. Ibid., 291, 292, sec. 1.
•1 Journal of Proceedings of the Colorado State Grange, 1888, p, 24.n Report of Colo. State Engineer. 1889-1890, l., 51.
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water contracts. The constitutionality of this practice was challenged in the case of Farmers' High Line Canal and Reservoir Co.
et al v. Southworth (1889), an appeal to the supreme court from the
district court of Arapahoe county. Appellant sought to enjoin the
pro rating of the carrier's diminished supply of water (in 1888)
between himself and certain consumers taking from the canal subsequent to April l, 1881, the date of the appellant's appropriation;
and to compel the company to furnish him the entire quantity of
water heretofore used by him. As stated by the chief justice the
issue was "Does the priority of appropriation, which by virtue of
the constitution gives the better right, apply to individual consumers
taking water through the agency of a carrier, so that notwithstanding the pro rating statute, each consumer acquires a separate constitutional priority of right, entitled to judicial enforcement, dating from the beginning of his specific use ?"38 Injunction was denied the appellant by two of the three justices, each reaching his
conclusion by independent arguments. Subsequent decisions have
followed the opinion of the chief justice; so this alone will be considered. The court held: ( l) T4at the act of turning water from
the carrier's canal into his lateral cannot be regarded as a diversion
within the meaning of the constitution; nor can this act by itself,
when combined with use, create a valid constitutional appropriation.
(2) There is therefore no escape from the conclusion in the Wheeler
action, that in cases like the present the carrier's diversion from
the natural stream must unite with the consumer's use in order to
create a complete appropriation within the meaning of our fundamental law. The constitution recognizes priorities only among those
taking water from the natural streams. (3) All co-consumers taking water from the same ditch within a reasonable time have priorities of even date with each other.84
The United States Senate Select Committee on Irrigation, visiting Denver in 1890, found the great complaint in Colorado arose
from the payment of royalties to ·ditch companies and the alleged
sale of water the carrying companies could not deliver.85 • Farm
leaders admitted that the law forbade royalties and gave the county
commissioners power to fix a just water rate. However, the canal
corporations continued to include royalties in their water rates and
often forced payment by the irrigators. The board of county commissioners was powerless to force the observance of their rate by
canal companies. If the latter refused to deliver water at the
• 13 Colo. n9, (188g).
at Ibid. 120, 121.
11

Stewart Report, V., Pt.

I,

p. 76.
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legally established rate, the irrigator was left to compel delivery by
mandamtts.86 But the cost of legal action and the inevitable delay
incident to court procedure sometimes made the payment of royalties
the lesser of two evils. Further, both renters and purchasers of
water-rights denounced the corporations who in their eagerness for
revenue sold water-rights beyond their capacity to deliver. Frequently the farmer did not receive the water paid for in advance;
he found his crops burned and was unable to meet the interest on
the mortgage given to the .water company for land and water-right.
There was repeated testimony that the water company had all the
penalties on the farmer, and that he was powerless to collect damages for non-delivery of water stipulated in his contract.37
To give temporary relief to the irrigators, it was urged that the
state have power to say when the waters of a given stream were
exhaust~d, and to prevent further building of ditches under such
conditions; also, that state officials should control the headgates and
laterals of consumers under a corporate canal. Then the state could
check the sale of water to consumers with the amount delivered and
with the volume of the canal's priority. The ultimate remedy ·proposed was state ownership of corporate canal works. 88
Under the auspices of leaders of farm organizations the irrigators
launched an independent party in the state campaign of 18go. The
leading plank of the Independent platform demanded· the recognition of priorities among co-consumers and the establishment of a
system whereby "the state may acquire, conduct, own, and operate
all ditches and reservoirs". 39 Following the surer mode of zigzag
the Republican convention urged a revision of the irrigation laws,
and deprecated the practice in vogue of ditch companies selling and
receiving pay in advance for water which they could not possibly
deliver;' 0 Since the consumers under corporate canals were but a
minority of the farming population, which in tum was outnumbered
by other occupations, the outcome of this state election is not surprising. The Independents polled 6.7% of the combined vote of the
old parties.41 Lack of leadership, funds and organization made
doubly sure the defeat of the Grangers at the polls.
.
Early in I8gI the Colorado Farmers' Protective Union was formed
to check the dissipation of strength inherent in isolated and inIbid. VI., Pt. 4, pp. 348, 361, 36:1.
Ibid., V., Pt. l, p. 76; VI.,, Pt. 4, pp. 346, 347, 351.
• Ibid., VI., Pt. 4, pp. 348, 350.
•Rocky Mountain News. Aug. zz, 1890•
.. Denvex Republican, Sept. 19, zo, 1890.
ct Colo. House Journal, 1891, p. :13.
M

11
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dependent organizations seeking reform of water law.42 The executive committee of the Union lobbied in the legislature for a bill providing public officials to measure the exact amount of water delivered
by ditch companies to each farmer; for two deposits in the county
treasurer's office to cover the annual water charge, said deposits to
be disbursed to the ditch company only upon evidence that the water
was actually furnished to the irrigator; and for the dissolution of
any company overselling its water supply. This bill died in the
legislature.' 8
Apropos of the Union's legislative activities, the Rocky Mountain
News denounced corporate efforts to repeal the anti-royalty act
and bitterly arraigned the water companies. "To collect pay for
water they do not carry, to require royalties aµd bonuses before
they sell water, to set themselves up as privileged organizations not
subject to commercial losses, as other people,-all these assumptions
are a part and parcel of corporate arrogance borne far too long."44
Eminent engineers and a non-partisan commission have in large
part confirmed the various indictments of water companies. The
Colorado Irrigation Commission provided by the legislature in 1889
consisted of an ex-state engineer, ·a ditch promoter, and a judge,
appointed by the governor to report a revision of the state irrigation law. Reporting in 1890 the commission essayed a remedy
for the over-sale of water-rights, but did not subscribe to the denunciation of royalties by the engineer member or to his demand
for greater protection of co-consumers under a corporate ditch.45
Mr. J. S. Greene, the minority member, vigorously assailed the
Colorado water law in a paper read before the American Society
of Irrigation Engineers in 1892. He declared statute law had encouraged one class of citizens to prey upon another by a· failure to
recognize the full constitutional rights of users of water, and by
magnifying the rights of those who simply effected the diversion
and conveyance of water. Hence the ditch companies had assumed
not only the rights of appropriators of water but claimed a right
in water equivalent to ownership, and presumed to dictate not only
the price of water-rights, but also who may and who shall not use
the public waters.48 He urged stringent legislation to prohibit royalties effectively, and to establish an equality of rights between. car.. Colorado Fanner, Jan. 1, 1891; Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 9, I891.
<a Rocky Mountain News, Jan. Io, 189I •
.. Ibid. Feb. 9, 1891 •
.. Report of the Commission Appointed by His Excellency, the Governor of the
State of Colorado, to Revise the Laws of the State Regulating the Appropriation, Distribution and Use of Water, Denver, 1890, p. Io.
"Ann~al of the American Society of Irrigation Engineers, 1892-1893, p. 140.
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riers and consumers by a determination of ( l) the manner of ac-quiring the right to divert, right to use and the right to appropriate
water, (2) the extent of enjoyment of these rights, (3) the mutual
relations of these rights and the necessary limitations upon their
cxercise.47 A year earlier Elwood Mead, at one time assistant state
engineer, wrote "there is no question of the need to guard the rights
.and privileges connected with the diversion and transportation of
water to the place of use, but this does not necessitate total disregard of the rights of a user. The basing of appropriation on construction of ditches was a primitive conception * * *. Appropriation should be based on use, and when made for irrigation, should
be attached to the land reclaimed and water rights made to go with
land titles."48
The Granger agitation for drastic reform of the water law evoked
.i10 response from the legislators preoccupied with the vagaries of a
Populist administration, industrial disorders, and free silver politics.
Neither in the nineties nor subsequently did the legislature enact
any fundamental changes in the laws of 1879 and 1887 regulating
ditch corporations. Matters clearly within the province of the legislature have been thrown upon ~e courts, and the slow and cumbrous judicial machinery has been set to grinding out a conclusion
concerning water rights, which the dictum of the legislature could
have established by law in a single session. If the legislature has
been remiss in its obligation to afford equal protection under the
law to irrigators and ditch corporations, the courts-by contrast at
least-have shown commendable zeal in dispensing even-handed
justice to farmer and capitalist alike. There has been slight devia·tion from the ideal of the supreme bench enunciated in 1887: "The
courts should protect the consumer in the full enjoyment of his
.constitutional and statutory rights; but they should also jealously
guard the rights of the carrier, and so deal with it (the constitution
and statutes permitting) as to encourage the investment of capital in
the construction of reservoirs and canals for the storage and transportation of water". 49 A long line of decisions following and expanding the ·wheeler case has done much to solve vexing problems
properly within legislative competence, such as definition of the
property right in priorities, prevention of speculative holding of
water, provision of damages for a failure to deliver the volume
of water paid for in advance, protection of the rights of irrigators
against excess sale of water by the canal company, definition of
"Ibid. 1892·1893, p. 142•
.,. Irrigation Age, June 15, 1891, p. 85.
0 IO Colo. 587.
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"estimated capacity" as used in water contracts, and the adoption
of a standard for fixing reasonable water rates.
The decision of the supreme court in Strickler v. Colorado Springs
( 1891) awakened the fear that ditch companies would be permitted
lo hold water as a purely speculative commodity. It was held that
"a priority to the use of water for irrigation is a property right, and
may be sold and transferred ·separately from the land in connection
with which the right ripened".60 However, a reassuring exposition
of this decision in Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Company (1892)
removed such apprehension. Basic premises were found in the
Wheeler and Southworth cases : ( l) the carrier in and of itself has
no independent priority (though the irrigation statutes use language that might give this impression), and any rights it may hold
in connection with the water diverted depend for their continuance
upon the use made by consumers. ( 2) The carrier becomes the
agent of the consumer, and exists for the purpose of aiding him in
the exercise of his constitutional right to the use of water owned
by the public.61 Therefore, the court found that "the ownership of
a prior right to the use of water is essentially different from the
ownership of stock in an irrigating company. The ownership of
the stock like the title to other property may be acquired by descent
or purchase; the ownership of the prior right can be acquired originally only by the actual beneficial use of the water * * *· He (the
stockholder) may transfer his stock to whom he will; but he can
only transfer his priority to some one who will continue to use the
water * * *· If ditch companies were at liberty to divert· water
without limit and at the same time make the ownership of stock an
absolute condition precedent to the right to procure water from their
irrigation canals, water rights would soon become a matter of speculation and monopoly * * *."62
The practical import of this decision was that ditch owners not
making beneficial use of diverted water within a reason.able time,
had to dispose of it for a proper consideration to irrigators pre~
pared to make beneficial use thereof. To this end the writ of
mandam1,ls was an appropriate remedy. But such writ was in~
appropriate to secure a perpetual right to the use of water; at
most it enforced an annually recurring right dependent, among other
things, upon an annual tender of the water rate. In the New
Mercer Ditch Company v. Armstrong (1895) non-use of water for

"° 16 Colo.
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61, 62.

Colo. 121, Farmers' High Line Canal and Reservoir Company v. Southworth.
"'17 Colo. 151, 152, Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Company.
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a period of nine years was considered unreasonable and working
forfeiture of the priority.53
A fruitful cause of Granger discontent was that water contracts,
while they penalized the irrigator for the slightest delay in payment
of water rates, practically absolved the ditch company from liability
for failure to deliver the stipulated volume of water. In Pawnee
Land and Canal Company v. Jenkins (1892) the ruling was: "a
ditch company that contracts with a patron to furnish him water
for irrigation, and fails to comply with its contract, by reason
whereof the patron suffers damages in loss of crops, is not relieved
from liability to damages by the mere fact of scarcity of water in
the stream from which the ditch was supplied, if by the diligent employment of proper measures to utilize the water that was in the
stream the catastrophe might have been averted. The company can
only be exonerated on proof of circumstances clearly showing that
the failure to perform was chargeable to vis major, and not to negligence and inattention."54 A similar decision, Rocky Ford Canal,
Reservoir, Land, Loan and Triest Company v. Simpson (1894),
was gratefully acclaimed by the Rocky Mountain News. "For years
they (ditch companies) have been robbing farmers of the state by
collecting rents in advance and then delivering water or not as the
same was convenient. If the farmer failed to get his water, and
lost his crop, he did not even get back the money he paid for it.
The robbery is now ended."55
Of vital importance to purchasers of perpetual water-rights was
the interpretation of the term "estimated capacity" employed in
water contracts. Upon this construction depended ( l) the protection of early purchasers of water-rights against subsequent excess
sale; (2) the date of transfer of the ditch company's stock to a
new company composed of paid-up purchasers of the first company's water-right; (3) the extent of responsibility of the new
company for water-rights sold by the original ditch corporation.
In Wyatt et al. v. The Larimer and Weld Irrigation Company
the appellants sought to enjoin the company from selling additional
water-rights beyond the 3660 then outstanding, and from pro
rating any of the water flowing in its canal at any time, when there
is not sufficient water to supply the existing water-rights, among
any other or additional holders in excess of 3660 rights ; for the
canal could not furnish water in excess of these rights. 56 The ap"' 21 Colo. 358, 365.
"' 1 Colo. App. 425 •
.. 5 Ibid., 34, 35; Irrigation Age, June, 1894, v. 6, p. 271.
N 18 Colo. 299, 304.
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pellees admitted the inability of the company to furnish water in.
excess of the water-rights then outstanding, but contended, notwithstanding, that it had the right to dispose of water-rights (according to its contracts) up to the estimated capacity of the canal. Pro
rating of earlier priorities would assure some supply to the later
'1olders. The issue was clearly joined: did estimated capacity mean
the carrying capacity of the canal or the furnf.shing capacity, the
ability to supply and deliver water ?57 Viewing the contract in the
light of the status accorded to canal corporations in the Wheeler
case the court sustained the plea of furnishing capacity as the proper
meaning of "estimated capacity." Contracts giving a corporation
the right to dispose of definite water-rights, and by ambiguous expressions in subsequent provisions reserving the power to render
such rights uncertain and indefinite, by disposing of water-rights
admittedly in excess of its ability to furnish water, were not only
inequitable and unfair but clearly illegal. Under such circumstances
the canal corporation impaired well defined rights of consumers
instead of acting as an intermediate agency to aid them in the exercise of their constitutional rights.58
Important applications of this interpretation of estimated capacity
were made in La Junta ancl Lamar Canal Company v. Hess (1895)~
and Larimer ancl Welcl Irrigation Company et al. v. Wyatt (1897).
In these cases it was held that the company having sold and outstanding water-rights equal to its capacity to furnish water, for
two-thirds of which it had been paid, the appellee was entitled to
relief compelling the company to perform that part of its contract
relating to the organization of a new corporation and the change of
ownership and control of the canal. 59 Thus performance of the
water company's agreement to transfer its stock under certain conditions to paid-up purchasers of a fixed percentage of its waterright was guaranteed.
With the transfer of a water corporation's stock to paid-up vendees of its priority, the question arose, "Were the vendees bound
to recognize the sale of water-rights by the vendor in excess of its
canal's estimated capacity?" This question was squarely before the
court in Blakely v. The Fort Lyon Canal Company (1903). Here
it was declared that the purchasers of water-rights up to the estimated capacity of the canal became its owners ; by their contracts of
purchase they assumed no obligations other than those mentioned
in the several deeds, which were limited to the maintenance and
If Ibid.
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control of the system after the ownership was vested in a company representing the purchasers ; that the company now representing the purchasers assumed no further obligations; and that
when the estimated capacity of the canal had been disposed of,
there was nothing more vested in either of the vendor companies
to sell, and the purchasers of excess rights took nothing by their
purchase. Moreover, the contracts of excess purchasers stated that
the vendor company had authority only to sell rights within the
estimated capacity of its canal; hence the purchasers were put upon
inquiry into previous sales. Since a reasonably diligent inquiry into
the status of the vendor's right to water would have disclosed its
previous disposal, the excess purchasers had acquired constructive
notice of this disposal at the time of their respective purchases.00
The plea that the canal had an estimated capacity equivalent to the
volume evidenced by recognized deeds and contracts cancelled as
excess sales, was unavailing. In the Wyatt case it was authoritatively settled that estimated capacity meant the ability of the canal
to supply or deliver water; that into this determination entered not
only physical capacity of the canal but the volume of its decreed
priority, and the probability of obtaining water therefrom under
normal conditions during the season of irrigation.61
A crowning difficulty thrust upon the courts for solution was the
establishment of water rates satisfactory both to consumer and
the ditch corporation. Exaction of a bonus or royalty has taken
one of two forms: (I) imposition as a prerequisite to the right to
rent water annually; (2) inclusion of the bonus in the annual rental
in the shape of excessive water rates. Both forms have been repeatedly nullified by orders of the county commissioners and court
decrees. However, the county commissioners are powerless to enforce their rates; so the consumer must often resort to mandamus
to compel delivery of water at the legally established rate. As
recently as 1912 the supreme court was called upon to declare invalid
the exaction of a bonus by a ditch corporation, as a condition of
performing its constitutional duty, the delivery. of water to the
consumer.62
The counter evil to royalties was the establishment of confiscatory
water rates by the county commissioners responsible to the people.
In Golden Canal Company v. Bright (1884) the supreme court announced, "We may agree fully with counsel that a review of the
decision of the board of county commissioners in the premises ought
"'31 Colo. 234, 235.
11 Ibid. 237-239 •
.. 22 Colo. App. 563, 570, 571, Northern Colorado Irrigation Co. v. Pouppirt.
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to be provided. There is opportunity for gross injustice to the
ditch owner on the one hand, or the consumer on the other, as the interest or inclination of the commissioners might dictate. But ottr
duty is to construe the statute, not to enact it; and·as the law now
stands no appeal from such decisions is provided".03 This opinion
was reaffirmed in South Boulder and R. C. Ditch Company v. Mar.fell et al. ( l8go) ; and the causi••.g the county commissioners to fix a
rate for water from the company's ditch, and declining to pay more
than such a rate, was adjudged a proper termination of a rental
contract.64
Drawing upon the armory of federal precedents the courts found
warrant, l8g5-18g6, for the judicial review of water rates fixed
by the county commissioners. In Leadville Water Company v.
City of Leadville et al. ( l8g6) the supreme court following C. M.
& St. P. Ry. Compa1iy v. Minnesota ( 134 U. S. 418) admitted the
power of the l~slature to regulate the compensation of individuals
or corporations exercising public franchises or services, provided
such compensation were reasonable, subject to judicial inquiry and
. determination, and not so inadequ~te as to work confiscation of property, or to take property without due process of law.65 Aside from
federal precedents this decision was a logical extension of the Wyatt
case protecting prior purchasers of water against impairment of
their rights by excess sale. The court then said : "a priority of right
to the use of water, being property, is protected by our constitution
so that no person can be deprived of it without 'due process of
law'." Both the ditch company and consumer shared the property
right in a prior appropriation of water.
The doctrine of judicial review of the rates established by the
county commissioners was amplified in Montezuma County v.
Montezuma Water and Land Conipany (1907). Fortified by the
federal decisions in Covington, etc. Company v. Sandford, Smyth
v. Ames, and the Railroad Commission cases, the supreme court denied that the county commissioners' regulatory power gave them
the authority to confiscate the property of the ditch owner; neither
did it give them the authority to compel the ditch owner to carry
the water without compensation. And since it clearly appeared
from the allegations of the complaint that the revenue to be derived by the plaintiff under the maximum rate as fixed by the commissioners was insufficient to pay the e~pense of maintenance and
operation of the system of canals and pay the taxes thereon, so
a 8 Colo. 155.
"' 15 Colo. 303, 309.
a 22 Colo. 305.
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that water could not be delivered without a loss, the result was not
only that plaintiff's property was taken without compensation, but
the plaintiff was compelled to pay for the privilege of rendering
the service of its waterworks. Hence the injunction of the district
court to restrain the enforcement of the rate fixed by the county
commissioners of Montezuma was sustained.06
The strength of this decision \,.ts impaired by McCracken v.
Montezuma Water and Land Company (1914). In 1895 the district court of Montezuma county enjoined the enforcement of a
water rate fixed by the county commissioners. Upon a second
petition the commissioners re-enacted the same rate (1903) set
down in the order vacated by the district court in 1895. It was held
by the court of appeals that fixing of the same rate by the board
was not to be regarded as a violation of the injunction, and not befog assailed in any direct proceeding, and no lack of jurisdiction
or excess authority being shown, the rate prescribed thereby be-came the lawful maximum rate binding on all concerned. Such
ruling would appear to entail a vicious circle of rate-fixing and
injunctions.67
To conclude. In the wake of railroad extension came the speculative development of canal corporations in the eighties, fostered
rather than controlled by legislative enactments. Since 1890 Colorado has been deeply concerned with the full utilization of canals
-constructed in the eighties, and the adjustment of the relations of
the ditch corporation and its consumers to each other and the state.
The period of adjustment has not yet ended. To this fact the unsettled problems of state intervention in the sale and delivery of
water by corporations bear ample testimony. But various factors
11ave operated to ease the strain incident to the dependence of consumers for their prosperity upon the policy of the corporate mid·dleman interposed between themselves and the water dedicated to
the public use. Chief among these mitigating factors have been
the increase in water supply by the construction of reservoirs and
the more economical use of water, the rise in general farm prices,
.and the gradual mutualization of corporate canals in accordance
with the stipulations of water contracts. By the trans£ er of corporate stock to consumers, co-operative management of canal works
is effected, and the evils of corporate control are practically eliminated. This transitional nature of the canal corporation must be
borne in mind to avoid misapprehension of its economic significance
., 39 Colo. x73·176•
.: 25 Colo. App. 280·281, 287.
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on the basis of current census statistics of commercial and co-operative irrigation enterprises.
By its invitation to settlement in the traditional desert the canal
corporation advanced the conquest of arid America, our last frontier.
And the pioneer, fully provided with canals and surrounded by
neighboring consumers of water, invoked state aid to protect himself against corporate control of his water supply. He appealed
in vain to the legislature which continued to exemplify a tendency
decried· by Major Powell in 1879. "The pioneers in the new countries of the United States have invariably been characterized by enterprise and industry and an intense desire for the speedy development of their new homes * * *· Under the impetus of this spirit,
irrigation companies are organized and capital invested in irrigating
canals, and but little heed is given to philosophic considerations of
political economy or to the ultimate condition of affairs in _which
their present enterprises will result." 68 The quickest and most effective response to the pioneer appeals came from the courts. They
proved to be more alive to the necessity of state control over the
relations of carrier and consume.r in the interest of_ equal justice
to both and the public welfare than the guardians of popular rights
in the legislature.
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